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stitution of the United States, in another exacted of its members an
oath to shield and preserve white supremacy, and in still another de-
clared any person actively opposing its principles to be a dangerous in-
gredient in the body politic of our country and an enemy to the weal
of our national commonwealth; that it was conducting a crusade against
Catholics, Jews, and negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race
prejudice; that it was striving for political power, and assuming a
sort of guardianship over the administration of local, state,- and na-
tional affairs; and that at times it was taking into its own hands the
punishment of what some of its members conceived to be crimes.
It is plain that the action of the courts below in holding that there
was a real and substantial basis for the distinction made between the
two sets of associations or orders was right and should not be disturbed.
Criticism is made of the classification on the further ground that the
regulation is confined to associations having a membership of twenty
or more persons. Classification based on numbers is not necessarily un-
reasonable. There are many instances in which it has been sustained.
It is not unreasonable in this instance. With good reason the legisla-
ture may have thought that an association of less than twenty persons
would have only a negligible influence, and be without the capacity
for harm that would make regulation needful.
CHAS. S. SHANE
Fraud; State Law Creating Presumption of, as to every Insolvency;
Due Process
The United States Supreme Court, in the recent case of Manley v.
State of Georgia, 49 S.Ct. 215, had occasion again to defend the
Fourteenth Amendment. The difficulty arose over the interpretation
of section 28, art. 20 of the State Banking Act of I919 (Acts Ga.
1919, p. 219) which is worded:
Every insolvency of a bank shall be deemed fraudulent, and the
president and directors shall be severally punished by imprisonment
and labor in the penitentiary for not less than one (i) year nor longer
than ten (io) years; provided, that the defendant in a case arising un-
der this section, may repel .the presumption of fraud by -showing that
the affairs of the bank have been fairly and legally administered, and
generally, with the same care and diligence that agents receiving a com-
mission for their services are required and bound by law to observe;
and upon such showing the jury shall acquit the prisoner.
This statute became of peculiar significance because of the adoption
of a new definition of insolvency in that year:
A bank shall be deemed to be insolvent, first, when it cannot meet
its liabilities as they become due in the regular course of business;
NOTES AND COMMENT
second, when the actual cash market value of its assets is insufficient to
pay its liabilities to depositors and other creditors; third, when its
reserve shall fall under the amount herein required and it shall fail
to make good such reserve within thirty (3o ) days after being required
to do so -by the superintendent of banks.1
In 1927, section 28 was construed in the light of the above definition
to mean that upon proof of insolvency, presumption of fraud on the
part of the president and directors followed naturally and they were
presumed to be guilty, no proof thereof on the part of the state being
necessary, the burden resting upon the officers to prove themselves in-
nocent, rebutting -the presumption by showing they were in no way
responsible, and bringing to light the facts causing such insolvency. 2
These presumptions, attorneys for Manley contended successfully,
violated -the Fourteenth Amendment because they were so unreasonable
and arbitrary as to amount to a denial of due process of law, since
mere inability to pay created the inference of crime and guilt without
any proof thereof being established, for -the Supreme Court so found.
Presumption in railroad accident: Not all presumptions, however,
have been found to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. In Mobile,
Jackson and Kansas City R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, Adm. 219 U. S. 35,
55 L.Ed. 78, 31 S.Ct. 36, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 226, Ann. Cas. 19I2A,
463, a Mississippi statute putting railroad companies in a class by them-
selves, the court said: (quoting the statute in question)
Injury to persons or property by railroads prima facie evidence of
want of skill, etc. In all actions against railroad companies for dam-
ages done to persons Or property, proof of injury .inflicted by the run-
ning of locomotives or cars of such company shall be prima facie
evidence of want of reasonable skill and care on the part of the serv-
ants of the company in reference to such injury. This seotion shall
also apply to passengers and employees of railroad companies ....
The statutory effect of the rule is to provide that evidence of an injury
arising from the actual operation of trains shall create an inference of
negligence, which is the main fact in issue. The only legal effect of this
inference is to cast upon the railroad company, the duty of producing
some evidence to the contrary . . . . it is not an unreasonable inference
that a derailment of railway cars is due to some negligence, either in
construction or maintenance of the track, or trains, or some careless-
ness in operation . . . the application of the act to injuries resulting
from the running of locomotives and cars is not an arbitrary classifica-
tion, but one resting upon considerations of public policy arising out
of the character of the business.
And the presumption of negligence was deemed not unconstitutional
nor in any way a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
'Section 5 Article I, Banking Act of igig, (Ga.)
2 i66 Ga. 578, 579; 144 S.E. i78.
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Presumption of crime upon failure to carry out labor contract: The
Thirteenth Amendment also is to be considered in connection with pre-
sumptions created by statute where one party fails to perform his
part of a contract for personal service, and fails also to pay back a
sum of money given as consideration by the other party for the faith-
ful performance of such contract. Alabama had a statute declaring
such a state of affairs as above indicated, to be prima facie evidence
of a criminal intent and punishable accordingly. In Bailey v. Alabama,
219 U.S. 219, 31 S.Ct. 45, 55 L.Ed. 191, the Supreme Court made its
position very clear in these words:
The act of Congress deprives of effect all legislative measures of
any state through which, directly or indirectly, the prohibited 'thing,
to wit, compulsory service to secure the payment of a debt may be
established or maintained, and we conclude that sec. 4730, as amended
by -the Code of Alabama, insofar as it makes the refusal or failure
to perform the act or service, without refunding the money, or paying
for the property, prima facie evidence received of the commission of
the crime which the section defines, is in conflict with the Thirteenth
Amendment, and the legislation authorized by that Amendment, and
is therefore invalid.
Presumption of monopoly: The Supreme Court expanded the amount
of territory covered by the above statement, in a later case by saying:
"It is not within the province of a legislature to declare an individual
guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime.' 3 And that the scope em-
bodied in .the word crime is far reaching, is evidenced .by the fact that
the statute causing -the above statement was one making the closing of a
refinery for a year or more, or the consistent purchase of sugar at a
price lower than in other states, prima facie evidence of a monopoly,
and outlining the punishment for its perpetration. Again the presump-
tion was deemed void as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus we see, that even though monopolies, our much heralded buga-
boo, are feared as a giant automaton crushing life and vigor out of
industry as exemplified by competition, yet ever watchful is our august
arbiter that presumption of crime-may not invade our rights as defined
by the Fourteenth Amendment, and to a not much less extent its twin
brother, the Thirteenth Amendment, and not even the mention of that
powerful monster, Monopoly, can deter its vigilence, and the attention
given to these presumptions can thereby be, to some degree, gauged and
measured.
OLIVER P. RHEINGANS
McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 36 S. Ct. 498, 6o
L.Ed. 899.
